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Telling fictional stories and engaging with the fictional stories of others is
an important and pervasive part of human culture. But people not only tell
and engage with fictional stories. They also reflect on the content of
stories, and on the way these are told. Grappling with the many issues
such reflection uncovers has long been a concern of professional
academics in language departments and other academic programs with a
focus on language. Philosophers should be included on this list. The
concept of fiction gives rise to a number of intriguing and complex
philosophical issues, and the philosophy of fiction has now become an
acknowledged part of mainstream philosophy, with a history that goes
back at least to the early debates about the role of poets and dramatists
found in the works of Aristotle and Plato. The issues in question broadly
relate to fiction as a mode of representation—a way of describing
individuals and events—that is strikingly different from representation
concerned with truth, the latter long a dominant theme in philosophy. Not
only is faithfulness to truth in the ordinary sense not a requirement in
fiction; fiction may even depart from truth in the things it talks about,
which typically include nonexistent individuals and even members of
nonexistent kinds (Holmes and hobbits, for example)—see the entry on
fictional entities.
There are also more indirect reasons for taking fiction seriously as a
philosophical topic. The last few decades have seen a surge of interest in
interpreting prominent yet (arguably) philosophically problematic areas of
enquiry—areas as far apart as mathematics and morality—as involving
something akin to fiction, a position known as fictionalism about those
areas. On such views, we should not believe the central claims of the area
because of their commitment to entities like numbers and objective moral
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facts; instead we should treat them the way we treat a distinctively
fictional claim like “Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective”:
something we know not to be literally true (after all, there never was a
Sherlock Holmes) but accept as true in some derivative or at least
nonliteral sense (unlike “Holmes was a plodding policeman”, say). The
continuing rise of fictionalism presents us with a new reason for treating
fiction as a significant philosophical topic, since it is a position that is
difficult to motivate independently of an understanding of what is
distinctive about fiction (Armour-Garb and Woodbridge 2015). (For more
on fictionalism and its ties to fiction, see the entry on fictionalism.)
One fundamental question raised by the notion of fiction is a conceptual
one: What makes something a work of fiction as opposed to a work of
non-fiction? A first attempt at saying what fiction is might portray it as a
kind of writing whose product is a written text (a work of fiction) that
misrepresents how the world actually is, although not in order to deceive
intended readers. This opposes it to non-fiction; even if a work of non-
fiction misrepresents the world, it is not intended by its author to be
recognized as something that misrepresents the world.
It doesn’t take much to see that this rough characterization is in fact far too
rough. A work of fiction needn’t be a written text, but could be a picture
(or series of pictures) or a representation in some other medium like film.
And the characterization lets in too much: a newspaper article attacking
some political position by engaging in the relentless use of irony, say, is
not a work of fiction but a work of non-fiction that uses irony.
The problem of saying how fiction differs from non-fiction is just one of
the hard problems faced by the philosophical study of fiction. Another
problem is that of specifying the sense in which a fictional sentence can be
true despite misdescribing how matters stand in the world. (A sentence
like “Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective”, for example, is not true if
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it is construed as a claim about brilliant detectives our world has known,
but counts as true if it is stated as an answer to a quiz question “Who was
Sherlock Holmes?” By contrast, “Sherlock Holmes was a plodding
policeman” would count as false in this context.) But in what sense can the
sentence be true, given that the world does not contain any such person as
Sherlock Holmes? One promising thought is that when we hear the
sentence as genuinely true we regard it as elliptical for something like “In
the Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective”. On this
suggestion it is the truth of the latter prefixed sentence that provides the
sense in which “Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective” counts as true.
But even if this is right, what still needs explaining is what it is for such a
prefixed sentence to be true. What makes “In the Holmes stories, Sherlock
Holmes was a brilliant detective” true (but not “In the Holmes stories,
Sherlock Holmes was a plodding policeman”), when there never was such
a person as Sherlock Holmes? In addition to the problem of how to
understand the notion of truth in a work of fiction, there is also a deep
puzzle about the way we respond emotionally to such truths. When we
engage with fiction, we often do so at a highly specific emotional level—
we may not only be enthralled by elements of the plot but also affected by
what befalls particular characters. Thus, we may find ourselves feeling
pity for Anna Karenina as we near the end of Tolstoy’s novel because we
are aware of Anna’s suffering. But the claim that we pity Anna Karenina is
deeply puzzling: we know there is no Anna Karenina, and that it is only
true in Tolstoy’s novel that Anna Karenina is suffering, so how can there
be genuine pity for Anna? This is the so-called paradox of fiction, one of a
batch of puzzles that have been raised in the philosophy of fiction about
our engagement with works of fiction.
These are by no means the only philosophical questions thrown up by
fiction. In fact, the paradox of fiction immediately suggests others. Taken
at face value, a statment like “Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective”
seems at best to be true in a work of fiction rather than true outright. By
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contrast, a statement like “Many readers pity Anna Karenina” seems to be
true outright. (The same goes for other statements relating fictional
characters to the real world, for example “Conan Doyle created Holmes”,
“Frodo doesn’t exist”, and “Holmes is more famous than any real
detective”.) This raises the thorny issue of the ontological commitments of
talk involving fiction. If it is genuinely true that many readers feel pity for
Anna Karenina or that Doyle created Holmes, then presumably there are
things—Anna Karenina and Holmes—about whom this is true. But how is
the claim that there are such objects consistent with the obvious truth that
Holmes and Anna Karenina don’t exist? And what could such nonexistent
objects be like? We leave detailed commentary on such ontological and
metaphysical questions to the entry on fictional entities. The present entry
is devoted to the nature of fiction and its “truths”, including our emotional
engagement with these truths—topics that can be discussed independently
of whether one is a realist or an antirealist about fictional entities. Before
we begin, it is worth noting that the study of these topics is not the
province of philosophers alone. Just what is fiction, for example, is a
question that also engages narratologists and historians of fiction (see, e.g.,
Gallagher 2006, Walsh 2007), although they approach the issue from
different academic perspectives, often with somewhat different aims in
mind. The present entry focuses mainly on the work of philosophers.
1. The Nature of Fiction
1.1 Semantic and Linguistic Accounts
1.2 Fiction as Making Up Stories
1.3 Fiction as Authorial Pretense
1.4 Fiction as Make-Believe
1.5 Speech-Act Accounts
1.6 Fiction, Pretense, and Cognitive Psychology
1.7 New Challenges
2. Truth in Fiction
2.1 Truth in Fiction as Truth in the Worlds of Fiction
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1. The Nature of Fiction
In whatever way we characterize the fiction/non-fiction distinction, the
distinction is widely recognized as important. We care which category a
work belongs to. We read Lord Macaulay’s The History of England (1848)
to learn about the overthrow of James II and its aftermath, and criticize
Macaulay for departures from fact or for bias: these detract from its value
as a work of non-fiction. Historical novels such as Tolstoy’s War and
Peace (1865–1867) or Hilary Mantel’s Wolf Hall (2009) also display bias
and they depart in numerous ways from fact, but the bias and inaccuracies
don’t lessen their value as works of fiction. And when a writer passes off a
work as a work of non-fiction, deliberately hiding the fact that much of its
content was made up, we see that as fraudulent. (There are numerous
examples. One famous case is “Jimmy’s World”, written for the
Washington Post in 1980 by journalist Janet Cooke; the article won her a
Pulitzer Prize that she later returned.)
Not everyone agrees that the distinction matters. Some have argued that all
discourse is on a par, that there is no writing that is per se fictional or non-
fictional. According to Stanley Fish, for example,
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Other writers make much of the fact that even non-fiction writers select
and structure what they write about and how they write about it. But even
if we grant all this, we don’t need to succumb to the kind of skeptical
position such authors argue for. It remains the case that fiction writers by
and large accept a distinction between the real world and the fictional
worlds they generate. The generation of such worlds, which often contain
individuals, objects, and even kinds of objects, that are very different from
those in the real world, is not simply a consequence of broad principles
about how we always stipulate and select and structure how we see the
world. In short, even those inclined to a kind of constructivist anti-realist
metaphysics on the basis of the sorts of arguments Fish appeals to might
nonetheless still admit a robust fiction/non-fiction distinction.
1.1 Semantic and Linguistic Accounts
But what might such a distinction look like? What makes a representation
like a written text a work of fiction? Dictionaries often contrast fiction with
fact or reality, so one tempting thought is that something is a fiction just if
it is false, or contains falsehoods: a purely semantic characterization of
“fiction”. This seems to have been Nelson Goodman’s view: “Literal
falsity distinguishes fiction from true report” (Goodman 1978: 124). As a
number of authors have pointed out, however, being false may be one
meaning of the word “fiction”, but it is not the only meaning, and it is not
the meaning at play when we nowadays call something a work of fiction
(Lamarque and Olsen 1994; Cohn 1999). If it were, then any work that
when we communicate, it is because we are parties to a set of
discourse agreements which are in effect decisions as to what can
be stipulated as a fact. It is these decisions and the agreement to
abide by them, rather than the availability of substance, that make
it possible for us to refer, whether we are novelists or reporters for
the New York Times. (Fish 1980: 242)
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contains mistakes, say a physics text book, would count as a work of
fiction.
(This is not to say that there is no connection between these two meanings
of “fiction”. Works of fiction typically contain numerous falsehoods, and
some have even speculated that the negative meaning of fiction as
falsehood may have “delayed the lexical move of calling novels ‘fiction’ to
a time when this genre had become a well-established, highly respected
literary form” [Cohn 1999: 3].)
Even if fiction in the intended sense can’t be defined in terms of the notion
of falsity alone, it might be thought that more complicated semantic
accounts will have a greater chance of success. Thus, Cohn herself thought
that fiction in the intended sense was “a literary nonreferential narrative”
(1999: 17), where being “nonreferential” means that the work need not,
and does not exclusively, refer to the real world outside the text, and that
any references when it does “are not bound to accuracy” (1999: 15).
But such an account inherits one problem that also affects the simpler
view of fiction as falsehood. Not only is nonreferentiality, like falsity, not
sufficient for a text to be a work of fiction (consider a history of science
text that contains a description of a failed scientific theory like phlogiston
theory); it is also not necessary. Works of fiction may be wholly true, and
in that sense refer exclusively to the real world outside the text. Imagine a
work of historical fiction written about real persons, where, unbeknownst
to the author, the parts that the author thought she was making up capture
exactly what really happened. That wouldn’t make the work a work of
non-fiction (Currie 1990: 9). In addition, the idea that references to the real
world outside the text are not bound to accuracy surely needs to be
weakened. Historical novels depend on their being more or less right about
a large part of their historical setting.
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Problems such as these have made semantic accounts of fiction relatively
unpopular with philosophers. The same is true of approaches that look for
textual differences between works of fiction and non-fiction. There seems
to be no feature of style or syntax that marks off a work as fictional rather
than non-fictional. For any proposed feature, say the use of footnotes or
indices in works of non-fiction or the use of the imperfect tense in fiction
(cf. Recanati 2000), one can find works from the other category that
simply mimic the feature. Certain literary scholars and linguists have
suggested an exception should be made for free indirect discourse, a
literary device whereby a character’s first-person take on events is
presented via third-person narration (as in this line from Emma by Jane
Austen, a master of this literary device: “He was afraid they should have a
very bad drive. He was afraid poor Isabella would not like it. And there
would be poor Emma in the carriage behind” [Austen 1815 [1841: 114]).
These theorists think free indirect discourse is peculiar to fiction (see
especially Banfield 1982). But there is substantial evidence to show that
other writing may also display this feature (see Fludernik 1993); even
Hemingway used it in his early journalistic writings (Blinova 2012), and it
is prominent in works of New Journalism, such as Truman Capote’s In
Cold Blood (1966). At best, the appearance of free indirect discourse
suggests that the work is a work of fiction; it doesn’t imply it (Friend
2012). And the use of free indirect discourse is scarcely necessary for
being a work of fiction. Many works show no sign of it.
1.2 Fiction as Making Up Stories
A more promising approach to understanding the fiction/non-fiction
distinction focuses not on semantic notions or stylistic features, but on the
author’s inventiveness in producing a text, whatever its semantic or
stylistic character. The best known such account is Harry Deutsch’s
“fiction as making up stories” (Deutsch 2000, 2013). Deutsch insists “we
cannot be left without a sharp distinction between fact and fiction” (2000:
Fiction
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149) even if we think, as Goodman did, that facts are themselves
fabricated. Crucial to the notion of fiction, he thinks, is that, unlike fact, it
is the product of creative, imaginative activity on the author’s part, activity
in which the author makes something up “out of whole cloth”. His own
distinctive take on this view explains the kind of fabrication involved in
fiction-making as the author’s stipulatively ascribing properties to
individuals, but where these properties match properties possessed by pre-
existing objects from the “fictional plenitude”, a domain that contains not
only every conceivable object and event but also an enormous range of
impossibilities (Deutsch 2000: 155–6).
Deutsch is particularly critical of a contrasting view, to be discussed later,
according to which what is necessary and sufficient for a work to be a
work of fiction is specified in terms of imaginative activity on the part of
the work’s readers rather than its author (Deutsch 2013: 366ff). But
focusing on the author seems to have its own problems. First, it suggests
that works like Cooke’s “Jimmy’s World” and James Frey’s A Million
Little Pieces (2003), both of which were substantially made up although
passed off as works of non-fiction, thereby count as works of fiction,
contrary to the usual classification of such works (see Friend 2012; Friend
agrees that we might pejoratively call A Million Little Pieces “just one
long fiction”, but sees this as an example of the ambiguity of the word
“fiction”). In response, Deutsch insists that, whatever our judgment about
Frey’s A Million Little Pieces, the case of Cooke is clear:
A second point, to be discussed below, is that numerous works of non-
fiction involve creative interpolations on the part of the author. If so,
Deutsch’s approach faces the danger that all such works should be
[she] exercised her authorial imagination. She did everything an
author of fiction would normally do. … If there ever was a case of
fiction masquerading as fact, this is it. (Deutsch 2013: 369)
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classified as part fiction, part non-fiction. But Deutsch denies that on such
a “fiction as making up stories” approach the inclusion of salient fictitious
elements is sufficient to make something a work of fiction (2013: 368)—it
all depends on the level of imaginative activity exhibited by the work.
1.3 Fiction as Authorial Pretense
Deutsch’s view is not the only one to highlight the central role of the
author in the definition of fictionality. A number of authors think that
fiction-making involves a special kind of speech act on the part of the
author, one that differs sharply from assertion (see especially Currie 1990,
to which we return below). Unlike Deutsch’s account, such views have the
capacity to classify works like “Jimmy’s World” as non-fiction on the
grounds that authors assert the content of such works; even if much of this
content is made up, authors intend readers to take it as factual. Just how to
characterize a special speech act of fiction-making or story-telling is no
easy matter, however. Take Nicholas Wolterstorff’s view that story-tellers
engage in “presenting or offering for consideration” propositions for
audiences to reflect on (Wolterstorff 1980). But even scientists do this
when putting forward speculative theories, so it is hard to see how this sets
fiction apart from non-fiction. John Searle has in fact argued that attempts
to define a special illocutionary act of fiction-making are doomed to
failure, since they entail that fictional discourse must differ in meaning
from ordinary assertoric discourse (Searle 1975: 323–4; Predelli 2019
offers a sympathetic reconstruction of the argument). He proposes that we
should instead understand fiction-making in terms of pretense: authors
pretend to assert what they are saying (1975: 324). More generally,
the author of a work of fiction pretends to perform a series of
illocutionary acts, normally of the representative type [such as
assertion], (1975: 325)
Fiction
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but without any attempt to deceive. For Searle, therefore,
(that is, their presence in the case of non-fiction writing, their absence in
the case of fiction-making), and not in features of the text (1975: 325).
Searle’s appeal to the notion of pretense has been very influential, but as
stated the account seems inadequate in a number of ways. As he himself
admits, many works of fiction contain claims that seem to be put forward
as serious assertions (he cites the opening lines of Tolstoy’s Anna
Karenina, 1877), and so his theory at best defines what makes a fragment
of a work fictional, not what makes a work fictional (Searle 1975: 331–2).
(Searle’s account shares this feature with a number of other accounts; we
look at ways in which theorists have responded below.) Furthermore, not
only is pretense not necessary for something to be (part of) a work of
fiction, it is also not sufficient: one can pretend to engage in an
illocutionary act for all kinds of reasons other than the fact that one is
writing fiction—one might just be engaging in mimicry or verbal irony, for
example (Currie 1990: 17).
Despite the latter problem, pretense has played, and continues to play, a
large role in the way philosophers understand fiction. Kripke, for example,
claimed as early as his 1973 John Locke Lectures that writing fiction
involved pretense, a view he then used to argue against attempts to use
fiction in the defense of a descriptivist theory of reference for names
(Kripke 2013: 23). David Lewis too saw story-telling as pretense: in his
seminal work on truth in fiction he claimed that “the story-teller [pretends]
to be telling the truth about matters whereof he has knowledge” (Lewis
1978 [1983: 266]). Neither claimed to be defining fiction in terms of
the identifying criterion for whether or not a text is a work of
fiction must of necessity lie in the illocutionary intentions of the
author
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pretense, however. Lewis, for example, acknowledges that sometimes one
pretends in order to deceive, unlike the story-teller (Lewis 1987 [1983:
266]).
1.4 Fiction as Make-Believe
The problems faced by pretense accounts of fiction that only consider
what authors do have made some philosophers look instead at the role that
readers play. Indeed, approaches that look at the role of readers (or, more
generally, consumers) of fiction have now become standard in the
literature. Kendall Walton’s version of such a view appeared in his
ground-breaking Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the
Representational Arts (Walton 1990). Walton focuses on the way a text
can be used as a resource in games of make-believe in which participants
pretend, imagine, or make believe that the world is as the text represents it
as being. (Walton’s view, it should be stressed, applies to representational
entities in general: dolls, globs of mud, paintings, sculptures, and so on,
not just literary texts.) Just as children use tree stumps as props in a game
of make-believe in which the stumps count as bears, so a community of
readers can use a text as a prop in a game of make-believe in which the
text is treated as a record of events, situations, conversations, etc. Any text
whose function it is to serve as a prop in a game of make-believe, thereby
prescribing imaginings about its content, counts as a work of fiction for
Walton. (Function is determined by a number of factors such as author’s
intentions and views about how the work can be appropriately used;
Walton 1990: 91.) If readers let their imaginings be directed in this way,
they are then participating in a game of make-believe that is authorized by
the work.
For Walton, then, what is necessary for a text to count as a work of fiction
is that it is supposed to serve as a prop in a game of make-believe, one that
requires readers of the text to make believe its content. Note that this does
Fiction
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not exclude the author from having a similar attitude to the work. Authors
too may imagine or make believe or pretend that what they are saying is
true (cf. Searle), but what is crucial to a work of fiction is that this is a
requirement on consumers of fiction. (For this reason, day-dreaming out
loud does not count as fiction.) Walton argues that this make-believe view
prevents most biographies, textbooks, newspaper articles, and the like,
from being works of fiction, since it is
But there is a complication. Walton intends the account to provide a
sufficient condition for being a work of fiction, not just a necessary
condition. In proposing this, he self-consciously departs from our ordinary,
intuitive concept of fiction, which he sees as only “a rough everyday
classification” (Walton 1990: 72) in urgent need of refinement (among
other problems, the ordinary concept of fiction is liable to treat certain
works, for example, didactic dialogues like Berkeley’s Three Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous (1713), as both non-fiction and fiction;
Walton 1990: 72). But that means that his new way of construing the
fiction/non-fiction distinction does not align with the usual way of
understanding it, since many works of apparent non-fiction—many
newspaper articles, biographies, real-life adventure tales, and so on—are
written in a way that is designed to engage readers’ imagination and so
satisfy the conditions for being works of fiction. Thus, he writes
not [their] function, as such, to serve as props in games of make-
believe. They are used to claim truth for certain propositions rather
than to make propositions fictional. (1990: 70)
Some histories are written in such a vivid, novelistic style that they
almost inevitably induce the reader to imagine what is said,
regardless of whether or not he believes it. (Indeed, this may be
true of Prescott’s History of the Conquest of Peru.) If we think of
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Similarly, there is
and so counts as fiction for Walton. Walton even thinks that any metaphor
is a fiction since a metaphor prescribes imagining (Walton 1993), and that
objects that were not produced to function in this way, such as naturally
produced cracks in a rock, could be treated as props that prompt
imaginings, and so could turn out to be a work of fiction (Walton 1990:
87).
1.5 Speech-Act Accounts
For many critics (e.g., Currie 1990: 36; Lamarque & Olsen 1994, 48;
Davies 2001: 264; Stock 2017) these are unwanted consequences for an
account of fiction. Excitingly told histories are still histories and so should
be classified as non-fiction; and the fact that cracks in a rock might prompt
imaginings just shows that the rock could be treated as a work of fiction,
not that it could turn out to be a work of fiction. These critics worry that
Walton’s conception of fiction is far broader than the traditional one (to
mark this point, Friend 2008, 152, distinguishes what she calls “walt-
fiction” from fiction in the usual sense), and insist that it is the latter notion
that needs analysis or explication. In the case of this traditional notion,
they think we should let the author’s intentions determine fictionality, just
as Searle proposed, but, unlike Searle, they propose that this be done by
focusing on how the author intends an audience to respond to a text rather
than on the author’s own attitude to the text. One influential proposal of
this type, defended by Greg Currie in The Nature of Fiction (1990), holds
the work as prescribing such a reaction, it serves as a prop in a
game of make-believe. (Walton 1990: 71)
no doubt that [Norman Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song—a
novelistic retelling of the execution of Gary Gilmore] … has the
function of prescribing imaginings (Walton 1990: 80)
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that authors engage in a special illocutionary act of fictive utterance, which
Currie then proceeds to describe in terms of Gricean reflexive intentions
(cf. Grice 1957). In a fictive utterance, the author produces a text with
fictive intent, in the sense he
We can then say that
The second clause is added because Currie thinks that truth alone does not
disqualify a text from being fiction; an author may write a story that, quite
by chance, ends up correctly describing actual events. But if it is no
accident that the work is true—if the work is somehow the result of the
represented facts being the way they are (for example, by the author
recording these facts from memory, even repressed memory)—then the
work is non-fiction rather than fiction (Currie 1990: 47).
Currie is aware that as it stands this account needs finessing, since many
fictional works have a basis in actual fact. But for the most part Currie has
remained true to this fictive utterance account of fiction. Later work
changes some of the scaffolding of the theory, but not its essential
structure. For example, Currie (1995a) introduces a broader philosophical
conception of imagination—simulation—that covers both mental imagery
and propositional imagining; he further suggests that “readers of fiction
simulate the state of a hypothetical reader of fact” (Currie 1997: 144), and
in doing so may also simulate the mental states of the characters with
whom they (as simulators of the hypothetical reader of fact) are
intends that we make-believe the text (or rather its constituent
propositions) and he intends to get us to do this by means of our
recognition of that very intention. (Currie 1990: 30)
a work is fiction iff (a) it is the product of a fictive intent and (b) if
the work is true, then it is at most accidentally true. (1990: 46)
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emotionally engaged. (Matravers 2014, ch. 3, criticizes the view that such
simulation is distinctive of fiction.)
Other authors offer variations on Currie’s fictive utterance account.
Lamarque and Olsen, for example, think that in the case of fiction an
author presents sentences, aiming
To attend to the sentences in this way is to adopt the fictive stance towards
them, and it is an author’s invitation that readers adopt the fictive stance
that makes something a work of fiction rather than non-fiction. Readers
who adopt the fictive stance towards the sentences can infer neither that
the author believes them nor that they are true.
Lamarque and Olsen thus retain Currie’s view that there is a negative
association between awareness that certain sentences are true and their
status as fiction. But as we already saw when discussing semantic accounts
of fictionality and, later, Searle’s pretense account, any such negative
association highlights a further problem. Some works of fiction, perhaps
most, make authorial pronouncements that are taken by both author and
readers to be true (historical novels are an obvious example). Works of
fiction often contain true descriptions of their geographical, historical,
political, and social setting, while works that belong to particular genres
require true descriptions of this kind if they are to be successful instances
of the genres (consider the setting of historical fiction like Vidal’s Lincoln
(1984) or social-political fiction like Sinclair’s The Jungle (1906), or the
descriptions of the practice of policing and forensic science in Cornwell’s
Scarpetta series, for example; see also Gibson 2007: ch. 5; Matravers
for the audience to make-believe (imagine or pretend) that the
standard speech act commitments associated with the sentences are
operative even while knowing they are not. (Lamarque & Olsen
1994: 43)
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2014). So there are parts of many, if not most, works of fiction that are
non-accidentally true, and so the works should not straightforwardly count
as fiction according to the criteria set out by Currie and by Lamarque and
Olsen.
Those in the fictive utterance tradition have responded to this problem in
different ways. One response is to invoke a further distinction between the
fictionality of statements contained in the work and the fictionality of the
work itself, taking the former as fundamental. Currie, for example, claims
that his account is primarily an account of the fictionality of statements
contained in a work, with the fictionality of the work depending on the
status of such statements “in some perhaps irremediably vague way”
(Currie 1990: 49). Most fictional works, Currie thinks, are “a patchwork of
fiction-making and assertion” (1990: 48–9). (For criticisms of such a
“patchwork” theory of fiction, see, for example Friend 2008, 2011; Stock
2011, 2017.)
The second kind of response to this issue is more holistic. David Davies,
for example, thinks that the primary focus of the fiction/non-fiction divide
should be on narratives rather than whole works (works might contain a
series of narratives). What makes a narrative fictional or non-fictional are
the author’s purposes and the constraints she works under (Davies 2007).
If, for example, she feels herself bound by the “fidelity constraint”
(roughly, that one should only mention events that one believes to have
occurred, in the order in which they occurred), she is writing non-fiction,
whereas if she is motivated by some more general purpose in story-telling
such as the desire to entertain her audience she is writing fiction. As a
result, even a narrative that tracks actual events can be fiction if the
author’s story-telling purposes override the fidelity constraint (Davies
2007: 47). (For criticism of Davies’s narrative view of fiction, see Friend
2008, Stock 2017.)
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By contrast, Kathleen Stock’s account of fiction allows that fictions may
include propositions that are put forward simply because they are
important truths, and so material that should be believed and not just
imagined (e.g., the comments on slavery and Christianity in Beecher
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1851)). For Stock, such beliefs are not
outliers, for she thinks that even if a person imagines something that she
also believes, she will (be disposed to) conjoin this in thought with other
propositions that she does not believe (Stock 2011; 2017, 147). Stock then
defines a fiction as, roughly, as a collection of fictive utterances in Currie’s
sense that are subject to the condition that where there is more than one
fictive utterance present, the author must also intend the reader or hearer to
imagine them conjunctively. A fictional work, she thinks, is different. It is
something usually carefully constructed and usually either written down
for posterity, or performed publicly. By contrast, a fiction may be uttered
only once, in a brief conversation with a single interlocutor (Stock 2017:
169–174).
These accounts all take authorial intention to be essential to being a
fiction. For Walton, by contrast, the emphasis on authorial intention
mistakes what are at best consequences of the author’s having constructed
a fiction for an essential feature of fiction (Walton 1990: 87). He thinks
that this is borne out by the fact that
All this confirms, he thinks, that the basic concept of a fiction is best
thought of as attaching to objects whose function is to serve as a prop of a
certain sort in games of make-believe rather than to illocutionary actions
(1990: 87). (For further discussion of Walton’s arguments on this point,
see Stock 2017: ch. 7.)
[o]ne may well read a story or contemplate a picture (which is a
fiction) without wondering which fictional truths the author or
artist meant to generate. (1990: 88)
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1.6 Fiction, Pretense, and Cognitive Psychology
In the previous subsection we considered views, beginning with Currie’s,
that take awareness that certain sentences are true to count against their
status as fiction, or that look to more holistic features of the text to show
why this awareness does not compromise their status as fiction. These
views all hold that merely appealing to the imagination does not capture
what is essential to fiction; they attempt in different ways to identify what
else is necessary. In the next section we look at some influential new
challenges to these views, but in the present section we adopt a different
orientation. In order to narrow down the sense in which fiction on the
ordinary, intuitive understanding prompts imaginings we describe some
work on make-believe or pretense in the cognitive sciences. As we will
see, there are some clear points of contact between this work and some of
the views considered above.
Consider in particular the popular “multiple models” theory according to
which an agent engaging in make-believe entertains a representational
model—the pretend (or, more broadly, imaginary) model—that is different
from the representational model she normally uses—the reality model.
The reality model in this set-up represents how the agent believes things
actually unfold, while the pretend model represents how things unfold in
an imaginary world, a world of make-believe (Perner 1991). Nothing,
however, prevents the pretend model from also storing actual beliefs, as
may happen with fictions that import representations of the real world. The
point is simply that once they are stored in the pretend model, those beliefs
have to be evaluated with respect to the imaginary rather than the real
world. The pretend model thus becomes part of an offline reasoning
mechanism in which beliefs are disconnected from actions occurring in the
real world. In particular, such beliefs don’t lead to the sort of actions that
would result if they were part of an online reasoning mechanism, which is
what the reality model is (Nichols & Stich 2003).
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But there is a problem with seeing the availability of a two-model account
as a sufficient condition for the relevant kind of make-believe. There are
people suffering from various clinical syndromes who also activate
distinct models of this kind, prompting them to exhibit incoherent patterns
of behavior. Thus, consider people affected by the Capgras syndrome.
While saying that a close relative has been replaced by an impostor, they
also behave in a friendly manner towards this “impostor”. Such people are
perhaps best interpreted as people whose odd beliefs are not integrated
into a single belief system (Young 2000).
A friend of the two-model account may say that people affected in this
way are to be classified differently from those engaging with fiction: their
“imaginary” beliefs are not quarantined from their “real” ones. But note
that the simultaneous yet distinct activation of the imaginary and reality
models also accounts for the cognitive situation of agents who are
somehow dissociated—subjects who experience a world of their own and
still do not lose their grip on the real world. Sleepwalkers are a clear case.
A sleepwalker may mobilize both the reality model, allowing her to avoid
obstacles while walking, and an imaginary model, in which she represents
the world she is dreaming about. Despite this, she is not engaged in make-
believe (Meini & Voltolini 2010).
One way of answering this challenge is to invoke Leslie’s identification of
fiction with metarepresentation (Leslie 1987). On this view, the required
quarantining of imaginary beliefs involves a metarepresentational level.
The difference between a subject who engages in make-believe and a
dissociated subject lies in the fact that the former acknowledges that the
representations entertained in the pretend model are not to be lumped
together with the representations that she entertains in the reality model.
Following a line of thought that can already be found in Vaihinger, who
originally drew a connection between fiction and awareness (1911 [1924]:
80, 98–9), Lillard writes:
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Proponents of such a view construe this kind of awareness as a second-
order representation that operates on first-order representations; it involves
a recognition that, insofar as the imaginary representations are stored in
the pretend model, it can’t be inferred that they represent the real world.
Note that Currie himself moves in this direction when arguing that
metarepresenting is required for pretending, as a way of combining his
intentionalist account of fiction with simulationist accounts (Currie 1998).
Some critics, however, think this idea is too demanding, that it
presupposes too intellectualist a view of pretending and hence of fiction
(see Perner 1991: 19–20, 35). For in order to have a metarepresentation of
a representation, one surely needs to represent it to oneself as a
representation, and young children in particular do not possess a notion of
representation (1991: 19–20, 35). Others think this criticism presupposes a
disputable conceptualist account of representing, and hence also of
metarepresenting (Meini & Voltolini 2010). Perner himself recognizes that
merely simultaneously entertaining distinct representations in different
models is not sufficient for make-believe, and suggests that the two
models have to be integrated into a single all-encompassing model which
nests both the pretend and the reality models. It is far from clear, however,
that this account is any less intellectualist than the metarepresentational
one that Perner criticizes, given the way it appeals to the idea of nesting.
Leslie had already pointed out that we invoke a nesting of this kind when,
from outside of a fiction F and typically from the perspective of reality, we
speak of F itself when we say “In fiction F, p” (Leslie 1987). Doing so,
however, requires possession of a notion that is even more conceptually
demanding than the notion of representation, namely the notion of fiction
a pretender must be aware of the actual situation and the nonactual,
represented one, or else (s)he is mistaken, not pretending. (2001:
497)
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itself, so this appeal to nesting should not be seen as unproblematic (Meini
& Voltolini 2010: 50).
1.7 New Challenges
The various accounts of fiction discussed so far in this section disagree on
numerous points, and, although pretense or imagination-based accounts
are probably the most widely supported, each one faces challenges and
there is no consensus as to which version is correct. But perhaps the most
radical challenge to all of these attempts to specify the nature of fiction has
come from theorists who think that the enterprise of finding necessary and
sufficient conditions for what it takes to be a work of fiction should be
abandoned. Such theorists think that there are genuine borderline cases
and cases that are, in some sense, admixtures of fiction and non-fiction,
and that such cases show that it is wrong to try to capture the notion of
fiction in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. (Note that the main
target for this challenge are theorists who think that there are intuitive
concepts of fiction and non-fiction that are worth articulating in the first
place. As we saw earlier, Walton’s approach is different: he urges
replacement of the traditional distinction.)
While Walton proposes replacing the intuitive fiction/non-fiction
distinction, Derek Matravers urges another path (Matravers 2014): the
philosophy of fiction should simply stop caring about this distinction and
shift its focus to the distinction between “confrontations” (situations that
involve our immediate environment, and thereby afford the possibility of
action) and “representations” (situations represented to us as happening at
other times or in other places, thereby denying us the possibility of action).
On the surface, it is hard to see this way of cashing out representations as
particularly illuminating, since it puts fictional representations in the same
basket as some scientific representations (2014: 53) and even historical
representations. But Matravers discerns one significant difference among
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representations: where they lie on the “thin” to “thick” continuum. Thin
representations (say, a physics text) merely aim to pass on information and
do not stimulate the imagination, while thick representations, such as
exciting histories and vivid novels, do. But Matravers insists that nothing
in the way we engage with thick representations separates fiction from
non-fiction, and that this is amply borne out by empirical studies of text-
processing by psychologists (see, for example, Green and Brock 2000):
Because of this, Matravers finds
A number of commentators, however, have denied that such empirical
studies really do have the implications that Matravers sees in them. For
Lamarque, for example, the modes of reading of literary critics and
historians involve different normative practices that determine what
questions are asked and where attention is directed (Lamarque 2016). And
Stacie Friend argues that even ordinary readers approach works of fiction
and non-fiction with different expectations (Friend forthcoming).
Friend agrees, however, that our engagement with works of fiction and
non-fiction alike involves a combination of imagining and belief. Some
works of non-fiction contain striking invented and hypothetical elements
(e.g., Tacitus’s Histories, which contains made-up battle scenes; Dutch
(1999), Edmund Morris’s authorized biography of Ronald Reagan, in
which Morris inserts himself into the story as the fictional narrator; and
The experience of reading de Quincey’s “The Revolt of the
Tartars” is the same whether we believe it is non-fictional, believe
it is fictional, or (as is most likely) we are ignorant of whether it is
non-fictional or fictional. (2014: 78)
[t]he traditional distinction, between representations that are fiction
and representations that are non-fiction, … entirely unhelpful.
(2014: 47)
Fred Kroon and Alberto Voltolini
Winter 2019 Edition 23
works of history that actively countenance the implications of certain
counterfactuals). At the same time, facts about what actually happened are
the dominant focus of some works of fiction such as Vidal’s Narratives of
Empire series. Friend thinks that such cases undermine accounts of the
fiction/non-fiction distinction by theorists like Currie, Lamarque & Olsen,
Davies, and Stock (see Friend 2008, 2011, 2012, forthcoming).
To deal with these and other hard cases, Friend recommends against trying
to find necessary and sufficient conditions for being a work of fiction,
although not by relinquishing the emphasis on works in favor of more
basic units like fictional statements and narratives. Instead, fiction and
non-fiction should be regarded as very broad genres in which particular
works are embedded, where a genre is a way of classifying representations
that guides appreciation. Borrowing from ideas in Walton’s “Categories of
Art” (Walton 1970), Friend argues that classifying a work as a work of
fiction or non-fiction depends on a range of features. A feature is standard
for a genre if possession of the feature tends to place the work in that
genre; contra-standard if possession tends to exclude the work from the
genre. (Features are variable if works can have or lack them without this
affecting membership in the genre, such as the number of chapters a work
contains). Thus, containing made-up material counts as standard for the
genre of fiction but contra-standard for non-fiction, while being faithful to
the facts counts as standard for non-fiction but contra-standard for fiction.
(As Friend notes, such a classification may itself change over time; the
kind of inventive embellishment found in Tacitus’s Histories, for example,
was once regarded as standard for historical non-fiction, but is now
regarded as contra-standard [Friend 2012: 192–193].)
A crucial claim of the ensuing genre theory of fiction/non-fiction is that
having contra-standard features for a genre does not simply exclude a
work from that genre. Capote’s In Cold Blood, for example, is a striking
piece of non-fiction precisely because it possesses certain features that
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were, at the time of its writing, contra-standard for non-fiction. What
explains the fact that we nonetheless class it as non-fiction has much to do
with other features of the work, including the reliance we place on
authorial intention: Capote took himself to be writing a kind of literary
journalism (Friend 2012: 194), just as Tacitus took himself to be writing
history after the fashion of his time. (Friend is somewhat unclear about the
content of such intentions, however. Presumably they can’t be understood
as intentions to write a certain kind of fiction or non-fiction, on pain of
circularity, although it is hard to see how else to construe them.)
For Friend, then, the classification of a work as fiction or non-fiction may
depend heavily on context: a weighing up of various standard and contra-
standard features that is strongly, but defeasibly, influenced by authorial
intentions. This opens the view to the objection that the classification is
too subjective for the distinction to count as theoretically important
(Voltolini 2016). Friend’s answer is that placement of a work in either the
genre of fiction or non-fiction directs our attention to different aspects of
the work, and even influences us to adopt a specific reading strategy
appropriate to works in the genre (Friend 2012: 202ff.; Friend
forthcoming)—a very different view from that of Matravers, who
discerned no interesting way in which our engagement with fictional
representation differs from our engagement with non-fictional
representations.
Those who favor other accounts have not been quiet in their opposition to
Friend’s proposal. Both Currie and Davies, for example, have defended
their versions of the fictive utterance theory by offering more nuanced
accounts of the way the fictional status of a work depends on the fictional
status of its parts (Currie 2014; Davies 2015). Thus, Currie argues that a
work’s fictional status supervenes on its intentional profile, which specifies
the communicative intentions behind the utterances that produce the work
(Currie 2014). One consequence of this view is that if a work uses as
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much imaginative reconstruction and invention of events as a fictional
work does (on our current understanding of this notion), then all else being
equal we should also count the first work as fiction. Currie takes this to
imply that Tacitus’s Annals and Histories, with their many made-up
elements, count as fiction rather than non-fiction—despite the fact that
Tacitus took himself to be writing non-fiction history (for objections, see
Friend 2012). By contrast, Davies again emphasizes that the fictional
status of a work depends on the fictional narrative(s) found in a work,
which he now construes as the fictive content readers are asked to make-
believe of a real setting: if the narrative serves to comment on something
asserted in the work then it is a work of non-fiction; if what is asserted
serves to comment on the narrative the work is fiction (Davies 2015, esp.
54). On this criterion, he thinks, Tacitus wrote non-fiction.
Stock agrees. On her account, if a work contains utterances that are not
fictive in her sense (that is, if they express propositions that readers are
meant to believe but that they are not supposed to conjoin in thought with
other propositions they are merely meant to make-believe), the work
counts as non-fiction. It follows, she thinks, that we should count works
like Tacitus’s Histories and Annals and Morris’s Dutch as non-fictional
patchworks of the fictive and non-fictive (Stock 2017: 160). Manuel
García-Carpintero (2013) offers another way of keeping a tight
fiction/non-fiction distinction. He defends a version of Currie’s view that
fiction-making prescribes imagining, but instead of appealing to the
psychological attitudes of those engaged in fictive acts, as Currie does, he
understands such prescriptions in terms of constitutive rules that specify
the commitments someone incurs when engaging in fiction-making, as
opposed to the constitutive rules that are involved in assertive acts. On this
normative view, claims that are asserted as true can be part of a work of
fiction, since, given the author’s purposes, one and the same fictive
utterance may be subject to both the norm of fiction-making and the norm
of assertion, as a performance of a direct as well as of an indirect speech
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act as it were (2013: 356f.). But García-Carpintero accepts that works of
non-fiction can include invitations to imagine as well, and he thinks that
works like Tacitus’s Histories and Annals straightforwardly count as a
patchwork of fact and fiction. (For discussion, see Stock 2017: 161–3.)
2. Truth in Fiction
Whatever the right theory of the nature of fiction, (nearly) everyone agrees
that there are paradigm cases of works of fiction. Many of the sentences in
such works are, of course, not true since in paradigm cases of fiction much
of the content is made up. For example, the sentence
is not true at any real context of utterance since there is no Sherlock
Holmes, and no Dr. Watson to utter the sentence. More generally,
sentences that purport to describe the world depicted in a work of fiction
are often false (or at least not true) since they misdescribe the world as it
actually is; “Holmes was a detective living at 221B Baker Street,
London”, for example. Still, this sentence sounds true, whereas a sentence
like “Holmes was a short-order cook living in Paris” sounds false. One
way of capturing this point is to say that fictional sentences are elliptic for
sentences with an “in the story” prefix (Lewis 1978 [1983]): what is true is
that in The Hound of the Baskervilles Dr. Watson and Sherlock Holmes sat
reminiscing in their sitting-room in Baker Street on a raw and foggy night
in November, just as it is true that in The Hound of the Baskervilles (and
virtually all the Holmes stories) Holmes was a detective living at 221B
Baker Street, London.
It was the end of November, and Holmes and I sat, upon a raw and
foggy night, on either side of a blazing fire in our sitting-room in
Baker Street. (The Hound of the Baskervilles, ch. 15)
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This shifts the problem of how to understand the kind of truth that
sentences have in a work of fiction to the actual truth of sentences of the
form “In work of fiction F, φ”. How should we understand such prefixed
sentences? It can’t simply be that a such a sentence is true if and only if φ
is explicitly stated in the text of F. For one thing, some things are not true
in a work despite being explicitly stated—the internal narrator of a story
may be highly unreliable (for example Charles Kinbote in Nabokov’s Pale
Fire [1962]). In addition, to identify something as an (obvious) truth of
fiction we often have to rely on various (uncontentious) interpretive moves
that belong to the pragmatics rather than semantics of language – what is
stated may go beyond what the words explicitly say (this is so even in the
case of a paradigm fictional truth like “Holmes lived at 221B Baker
Street”; see Hanley 2004).
Put the problem of the unreliable narrator aside for now, and assume that
normal practices of interpretation apply when identifying the fictional
truths stated in a work of fiction. Philosophers of fiction have been mainly
interested in the second problem: that of characterizing what it is for a
sentence to be true in a work despite not being stated in the work. A first
attempt might focus on the background of actual fact that is available to
readers of the work: given that London is the capital of Great Britain, the
fact that the Holmes stories say that Holmes lived in London suggests that
it is also true in the Holmes stories that Holmes lived in the capital of
Great Britain. The simplest way to capture this thought would be to say
that it is true in a fiction that p iff p is a logical consequence of the set of
propositions that are represented as true in a story, combined with the set
of all actual truths. But this suggestion won’t do. Many actual truths are
inconsistent with what is stated in a story, and so can’t be drawn upon in
this way to yield claims about what is true in the story. (It is actually true,
for example, that London did not have as inhabitant a famous detective
called “Holmes” who lived at 221B Baker St. But it is not true in the
Holmes stories that Holmes lived in a city that did not have as inhabitant a
Fiction
28 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
famous detective called “Holmes” who lived at 221B Baker St.) We need
to filter out the background that we can legitimately draw upon when we
determine what is true in a work.
2.1 Truth in Fiction as Truth in the Worlds of Fiction
David Lewis provided the classic discussion of this issue in his “Truth in
Fiction” (first published in 1978, reprinted with postscripts in 1983). His
approach has two core ideas. The first is that we should adopt a pretense
view of fiction. A fiction is a story told by a particular person on a
particular occasion, and to tell a story is typically to pretend that one is
relating an account of things that really did happen. The second core idea
is the one mentioned above: stories are related against a background of
(known) facts and beliefs, thereby ensuring that there is more to truth in
fiction than is stated in stories. The novelty of Lewis’s approach is the way
he understands this background and its impact in terms of the machinery
of possible worlds and the semantics of counterfactuals. To put the point
in technical jargon, Lewis treats in-the-fiction operators as special
intensional operators.xs
Lewis offers two main analyses. On Analysis 1, the background against
which a story is told is just actuality, appropriately filtered to remove
whatever is at odds with the story. Truth in a fiction is just what would
have been true had the fiction been told as known fact. In terms of Lewis’s
possible world analysis of counterfactuals (Lewis 1973), this can be
rendered as:
Analysis 1 A sentence of the form “In fiction F, φ” is non-vacuously true
if and only if some world where F is told as known fact and φ is true
differs less from our actual world, on balance, than does any world
where F is told as known fact and φ is not true. (1978 [1983: 270])
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Analysis 1 easily captures the fact that it is true in the Holmes stories that
Holmes had a liver, for example (despite no mention being made of this in
the stories). It also captures the fact that the fictional truth of many claims
is simply left indeterminate (while it is true in the stories that Holmes had
a liver, for example, it is not true in the stories that he had an average-
sized liver). But the analysis also seems to catch too much (Lewis 1978
[1983]; Currie 1990; Phillips 1999; Walton 1990; Wolterstorff 1980).
Given a story S, take any truth p that has no bearing on the events
described in S. On Lewis’s Analysis 1 it will then be true in S that p,
whether or not anyone believes that p. If, for example, Napoleon had
exactly 100,001 hairs on his head at the battle of Austerlitz, it will then be
true in the Holmes stories that he did.
If the unknown proposition p has implications for the events in the story,
another problem arises. Take the example mentioned by Lewis. Suppose,
as many think, that the swamp adder in “The Adventure of the Speckled
Band” (1892) was intended by Doyle to be a Russell’s viper (Lewis 1978
[1983: 271]; but cf. Byrne 1993: 25, note 5). In the story, Holmes
concludes that the murder victim in the story was killed by the snake’s
climbing down a fake bell-rope. The Russell’s viper is a constrictor,
however, so it cannot physically climb ropes, and hence Analysis 1
suggests that it is true in “The Speckled Band” that Holmes bungled
(Lewis 1978 [1983: 271]). But this would clearly be the wrong conclusion
to draw: what is true in the story is that Holmes was right. The fact that
Conan Doyle was ignorant of a little known biological fact should not
affect what is true in the Holmes stories.
This example suggests that it is (often) better to conceive the background
in epistemic terms. (But maybe not always; as Lewis points out, there is a
contested critical tradition that uses psychoanalytic views to interpret
literary texts, as in the claim that Hamlet had an Oedipus Complex. Such a
claim is probably best understood in terms of Analysis 1.) Lewis’s
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Analysis 2 provides such an epistemic orientation. It treats “background”
as beliefs that are overt in the author’s community, where
Take the collective belief worlds to be the worlds where all the overt
beliefs are true. Truth in fiction is what would have been true in the
collective belief worlds, had the fiction been told as known fact:
Analysis 2 A sentence of the form “In fiction F, φ” is non-vacuously true
iff whenever w is one of the collective belief worlds of the
community of origin of F, then some world where F is told as known
fact and φ is true differs less from w, on balance, than does any world
where F is told as known fact and φ is not true. (1978 [1983: 273])
Analysis 2 rules out the case of the hairs on Napoleon’s head since there is
no number h such that people collectively believed that Napoleon had h
hairs at the battle of Austerlitz (at best they accepted very rough upper and
lower bounds that allowed for 100,001 hairs but also considerably more or
fewer). And the analysis rules out the case of the Speckled Band since the
reception of the story by its readers showed that swamp adders from
climbing ropes. (In this case, the belief probably did not exist before
people began reading the story, but was acquired as a result of trusting the
author.) But the analysis also has some strikingly counterintuitive
consequences. Take a typical Victorian novel that nowhere takes a stance
on whether God exists. On Analysis 2 it will nonetheless be true in this
novel that God exists, simply because Victorian England was overtly
theistic so that the collective belief worlds are all worlds in which God
exists (Walton 1990). Similarly, it will be true in many works that there are
ghosts, and that women are markedly inferior to men.
a belief [is] overt for a community at a time iff more or less
everyone shares it, more or less everyone thinks that more or less
everyone shares it, and so on. (1978 [1983: 272])
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In the later postscripts to his paper, Lewis considers some needed
revisions to his two accounts. He conjectures, for example, that a story’s
explicit content and background may need supplementing by “carry-over”
of truths from other fictions if we are to capture what is true in a story
(Lewis 1978 [1983]; Hanley 2004). But the most widely discussed
revision that Lewis mentions, and the one that has generated most debate,
concerns the case of impossible fictions—fictions that cannot be told as
known fact in any possible world. We turn to this debate below (Sec 2.4)
after reviewing two other influential accounts of truth in fiction.
Some final remarks about the notion of worlds that features in Lewis’s
account and the many accounts inspired by his approach. Lewis’s worlds
are possible worlds. He himself construes these as maximal connected
spatio-temporal objects (Lewis 1986), although many others take them to
be abstract entities of some kind (see the entry on possible worlds). One
can accept Lewis’s account of truth in fiction while preferring one of these
alternative metaphysical conceptions of possible worlds. The important
point is that the notion of a possible world, no matter how conceived, is a
piece of modal machinery that has many other roles to play in
metaphysics. It should not be confused with the notion of a fictional world,
appealed to by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Fictional worlds
present themselves as realms, created by authors and generally incomplete
and sometimes inconsistent, that are more or less distant from the real
world but despite the distance are at least partially accessible from the real
world (thus, we can know about Holmes and admire him from a distance,
even if we can’t help him solve crimes). But although we often talk about
fiction in terms of fictional worlds, making literal sense of such talk is
fraught with difficulty (Pavel 1986 makes the attempt; Walton 1978 is a
salutary reminder of what can go wrong), and philosophers have tended to
take such talk with a grain of salt, construing fictional worlds instead as
sets of fictional truths (Walton 1978; Walton 1990, 64–67) or as sets of
worlds rather than single worlds (Lewis 1983, 270; Ross 1979, 49–54).
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Some have used the notion of a fictional world construed in some such
way to provide a kind of linguistic counterpart to the mental reality and
imaginary models discussed in 1.6, by appealing to the idea of a context of
utterance or interpretation. (For more on the relevant notion of context, see
the entry on Theories of Meaning.) On such a view, saying that a sentence
is aimed at correctly representing a fictional world means that the sentence
is to be interpreted relative to a context that contains the fictional world
rather than the actual world as its world parameter. Consider a sentence
like ‘Othello was jealous’. As uttered in a context that contains the actual
world as its world parameter, this sentence is not true since ‘Othello’ refers
to nothing there. But the very same sentence is true in a fictional context
that contains the fictional world of Othello as its world parameter, for at
that world ‘Othello’ refers to the jealous Venetian soldier of Shakespeare’s
play. This account arguably also accommodates the problem of how fiction
can contain real truths, as in historical fiction. In such cases, one and the
same sentence, say ‘Napoleon invaded Russia’, can be both actually and
fictionally true, keeping the very same content in both the real and the
fictional context.
This kind of account yields an alternative construal of in-the-fiction
operators. Rather than being a special kind of intensional operator, as it is
on Lewis’s account, an in-the-fiction operator turns out to be a context-
shifting operator. Take someone’s utterance of the sentence ‘In
Shakespeare’s Othello, Othello was jealous’. The operator is context-
shifting to the extent that the context relative to which we are to interpret
the embedded sentence ‘Othello is jealous’ is different from the context of
utterance of the sentence as a whole, since the latter is centered on the
actual world, rather than the fictional world of Othello. (See Recanati
2000, Predelli 2005, Bonomi 2008. Predelli 2008 offers a variation on
such accounts.)
2.2 Truth in Fiction as Make-Believe Truth
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Walton’s account of truth in fiction rests on his distinctive account of a
work of fiction as a prop in a game of make-believe, where the function of
the prop is to prescribe imaginings. Unlike Lewis, he doesn’t place stress
on the idea that fictional statements are implicitly prefixed with an “in the
fiction” operator. For Walton, a proposition is fictional—true in the fiction
—just in case participants in such a game of make-believe are supposed to
imagine it as true (Walton 1990; for some recent reservations about this
account, see Walton 2013, 2015). There are two types of fictional truth: the
primary fictional truths are evident in the work itself, while the implied
fictional truths are generated from the primary ones. The problem of how
to generate implied fictional truths from primary fictional truths is
essentially the problem that Lewis faced, and the principles that Walton
describes—the Reality Principle and the Mutual Belief Principle—are
close to Analysis 1 and 2, but without the commitment to the machinery of
possible worlds. Letting …  be the primary fictional truths of fiction
F, the Reality Principle holds that it is true in F that q iff had …  been
the case, q would have been the case, while the Mutual Belief Principle
holds that it is true in F that q iff the following was mutually and openly
believed in the society from which F originated: had …  been the
case, q would have been the case.
Walton acknowledges that each principle has counterintuitive
consequences (see Walton 1990, ch. 4, on the contrast and interplay
between the two principles). Lewis himself noted this in the case of the
Reality Principle, but as we remarked above the same seems true of the
Mutual Belief Principle. In addition, neither principle seems able to handle
cases in which genre conventions generate fictional truths. Consider an
otherwise typical zombie story that never explicitly says that zombies
move by stumbling forward rather than by running (Woodward 2011,
163). Because this way of moving is a conventional feature of zombies in
the zombie story genre, it will be true in the story that zombies don’t run,
even though the question “Do zombies run?” is probably not answerable
p1 pn
p1 pn
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by appeal to either principle (Woodward 2011: 163; Lewis 1978 [1983:
274]; Walton 1990: 161–9). Walton himself thinks that the moral to be
drawn from such difficulties is that these principles are no more than rules
of thumb, and that there is no single, general principle that governs the
practice of critics and appreciators of fiction (1990: 139). A rather
different approach to these problems is taken by Stacie Friend, who argues
that problems ensue if we insist on principles, taken as ways of inferring
implied fictional truths from primary fictional truths. Instead of defending
the Reality Principle, she defends what she calls the Reality Assumption,
the thesis that everything that is really true is also fictionally the case,
unless it is excluded by the work (Friend 2017).
There is a further concern about the apparatus Walton employs, one that
also affects Lewis’s account. To apply the above rules of generation, we
need to be able to determine a work’s primary fictional truths, those that
are evident in the work or, in Lewis’s terms, those that are part of what is
told as “known fact”. These present no trouble if we have a reliable
narrator, but what if the narrator is unreliable? With Lewis as his focus,
Currie imagines a situation in which the Holmes stories are written in a
“tone of understatement and irony”, so that Holmes appears only
somewhat successful even though in the story he is “spectacularly
successful” (Currie 1990: 70). Given that the worlds to be considered are
worlds in which the story is told as known fact, the worry is that, for
Lewis, Holmes is only somewhat successful in the stories. Walton’s
answer to this kind of problem is to allow free rein to the kind of
pragmatic interpretive moves that are used in ordinary communicative
exchanges (see Walton 1990: ch. 4). If there is evidence of understatement
and irony, we should make allowances for that when determining what is
true. Lewis has a broadly similar answer. In a footnote Lewis points out
that there are all kinds of ways of telling stories. Storytellers may present
themselves as quite unreliable (mad, naïve, etc.), or as translators of some
work rather than the person who wrote it, and so on. He adds that
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Hence if the author pretends to be recounting a true story in a tone of
understatement and irony, then the worlds of the story are those worlds in
which the teller really does tell a true story in a tone of understatement and
irony, not worlds where his actual words are to be taken literally (cf.
Hanley 2004).
2.3 Truth in Fiction and the Role of “Authors”
Currie’s answer to the problem of the unreliable narrator is quite different.
His account of what is true in fiction eschews any appeal to worlds in
favor and appeal to the beliefs of someone he calls the fictional author:
C “In the fiction F, φ” is true iff it is reasonable for the informed reader
to infer that the fictional author of F believes that φ (Currie 1990:
80).
Here the fictional author is “that fictional character constructed within our
make-believe whom we take to be telling us the story as known fact”
(Currie 1990: 76), and the “informed reader” is a reader who knows the
relevant facts about the community in which the work was written (1990:
97). The view also offers a distinctive way of dealing with the problem of
unreliable narrators. When the evidence suggests that a narrator is
unreliable, we are supposed to construct a hidden, completely reliable and
knowledgeable fictional author who is “speaking with the voice of one of
the (unreliable) characters in the story” (1990: 125); the reader figures out
what is true in the story by forming an impression of the beliefs of the
author, based on the text of the story and facts about its community of
origin. While many commentators have lauded the move away from
in these exceptional cases also, the thing to do is to consider those
worlds where the act of story-telling really is whatever it purports
to be—ravings, reliable translation of a reliable source, or
whatever—at our world. (Lewis 1978 [1983: 266 fn. 7])
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possible worlds, a number have doubted that positing such an author is
adequate to the task of explaining truth in fiction (e.g., Byrne 1993;
Howard-Snyder 2002; Swirski 2014), even complaining that it seems
gratuitous to postulate “some shadowy meta-narrator who has all true
beliefs but is choosing not to reveal himself” just to deal with a narrator
who is unreliable (Matravers 1995; see Currie 1995a, 1995b for further
discussion, and Currie 2010 for a more sceptical perspective on internal
narrators). Other philosophers have offered alternative accounts of the
(real, hypothetical, …) authors whose beliefs or intentions determine what
is true in fiction. Stock, for example, argues for an extreme intentionalism
on which, with some important qualifications aside, what is true in a
fiction is what the real author intends her audience to imagine as being
true (Stock 2017). Others prefer more moderate appeals to the real author
(e.g., Livingston 2005, for whom fictional truth rests on what it is
appropriate to make believe, given a goal of understanding fictive
utterances in the author’s artistic context).
Alex Byrne has a final criticism that he thinks affects Currie’s and Lewis’s
accounts of truth in fiction in equal measure. It is easy to see that if F is a
fiction then the sentence “In fiction F, F is told as known fact” is true for
both Lewis and Currie. Byrne (1993) labels this consequence of the two
views idealism, and he offers two objections. First, certain fictions are
what Currie calls mindless: fictions in which there is no intelligent life,
and so no one to tell the tale. In such stories, it is false that there is
someone who is telling the story. Second, postulating knowing tellers
would suggest quite extraordinary epistemic capacities on the part of these
tellers in the case of fictions that carry detailed information about the
psychology of characters, say. Currie’s response to the first kind of
complaint is that the postulation of a teller for every tale is simply a staple
of literary and aesthetic theory (Currie 1990: 75–6). If so, not worrying
about how the teller got her information (it is enough that she must have
got it somehow or other; cf. Hanley 2004) might be another such staple.
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One worry about such a response is that it seems little different from
saying we should treat the story as if it were told from a God’s eye point of
view. But the response is probably best treated as an instance of something
far more general: an appropriately dismissive attitude to certain sorts of
questions. Walton calls questions of this type “silly questions”. One of his
many examples concerns the way Othello is able to come up with superb
verse—in English too!—despite his great distress; another one concerns
the way narrators in literary works tell of events they could not possibly
know about (Walton 1990: 174ff). In Walton’s view, we should simply
stop worrying about the apparent threat posed by questions of this kind,
perhaps by disallowing or de-emphasizing offending fictional truths (such
as that Othello was a great literary talent, or that the narrator was
somehow able to determine that the characters in a novel “lived happily
ever after” (1990: 177–8)). Such questions are “largely if not entirely
irrelevant to appreciation and criticism” (Walton 1990, 238). If this is
right, there is little reason to think that idealism of the kind Byrne objects
to constitutes a fatal defect in the approaches of either Currie or Lewis.
Byrne himself defines truth in fiction in terms of what a Reader can infer
about what the Author invites him to make-believe, where the Reader and
Author are idealised entities identified in terms of pragmatic principles of
interpretation. This allows Byrne to explain how it can be true in a story
that there is no one left to tell the tale and why it is rarely true in stories
that there exists someone with unexplained and extraordinary
epistemological powers who knows the deepest thoughts of others (Byrne
1993). The same conclusion is available on some other author-based
views, such as those of Livingston 2005 and Stock 2017. In fact, all such
approaches promise to deliver a fairly direct way of defusing ‘silly
questions’ concerning truth in fiction.
Whatever the best way of dealing with the issue of ‘idealism’, it is an issue
that affects Lewis and Currie in equal measure. But there is another issue
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that some take to be an important reason for preferring an author-based
account like Currie’s to a possible worlds-based account like Lewis’s,
namely what sense to make of truth in impossible fictions, a topic we turn
to next.
2.4 Impossible Fictions
Some works of fiction describe scenarios that are impossible: not just
physically impossible (like fantasy stories), but metaphysically or
logically impossible (like certain time-travel stories and stories that deny
mathematical facts such as Ted Chiang’s “Division by Zero”, 1991). Early
in his paper, Lewis completes Analyses 1 and 2 with the clause: “In fiction
F, φ” is vacuously true iff there is no possible world where F is told as
known fact’. That clause implies that anything whatsoever is true in
impossible stories. But he then notes that some such stories involve venial
contradictions, contradictions due merely to a slip-up on the author’s part
(the Holmes stories, for example, since these sometimes locate Dr.
Watson’s old war wound in his leg and sometimes in his shoulder). To
avoid the unpalatable conclusion that anything whatsoever is true in these
stories as well, Lewis suggests towards the end of “Truth in Fiction” that
any such story should be represented as a series of minimally revised
consistent versions of the original, with truth in the story being truth in all
the minimally revised consistent versions (Lewis 1978 [1983: 274–5])—
what he later called the method of intersection. On this view, it is true in
the stories that Dr. Watson had a war-wound, but it is not true in the stories
that he had one on his shoulder and it is not true in the stories that he had
one on his leg.
Postscript B to the original article shows a change of mind. To preserve
what he calls the “distinctive peculiarity of inconsistent fiction” (Lewis
1983: 277), Lewis now suggests we adopt the method of union: what is
true in a fiction is what is true in at least one consistent fragment, so that
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we can have “In fiction F, ” is true and “In fiction F, ” is true, but
never “In fiction F, ” is true.
Yet, as Lewis himself acknowledged, this account does not work with
blatantly inconsistent stories whose contradictions are not venial, and with
respect to these stories he takes a hard line: “we should not expect to have
a non-trivial concept of truth in blatantly impossible fiction” (Lewis 1978
[1983: 275). Many disagree, offering examples of such stories where the
issue of truth and falsity appears to arise much as it does for consistent
stories. Currie’s (1990) example is of a story that turns on the hero’s
disproof of Gödel’s incompleteness results. Such a story simply can’t be
divided into consistent fragments. Similarly, consider Graham Priest’s
story of Sylvan’s Box, which involves the discovery of a box belonging to
the late Richard Sylvan that is at once empty and non-empty (Priest 1997,
2005). (Other examples may include stories about donkeys that talk and
pigs who lead revolutions, as well as fictions in which actual people and
fictional characters interact, for example, Pirandello’s Six Characters in
Search of an Author [1921]; cf. Byrne 1993; Woodward 2011; for an even
more radical take on the inconsistency in fiction, see Woods 2018.) Some
bite the Lewisian bullet at this point. Hanley (2004), for example, argues
that some such fictions may be susceptible to the method of union; in other
cases, the best way to interpret them is simply to doubt the reliability of
their narrators. Nolan (2007) similarly argues that our intuitive judgment
of what is true in the fiction in such cases tracks the narrator’s beliefs
rather than the represented facts.
Most writers agree, however, that there can be a coherent notion of truth in
fiction even for “blatantly” inconsistent fictions (see, for example, Byrne
1993; Le Poidevin 1995; Phillips 1999; Gendler 2000; Weatherson 2004,
Priest 2005, Proudfoot 2006). But even when there is agreement about
this, there is no agreement about the resources needed to capture such a
notion of truth. Some think that the best and perhaps most obvious
ϕ ¬ϕ
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ
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solution to the problem of inconsistent fiction is a generalization of
Lewis’s own approach: we should admit appropriately selected impossible
worlds to the set of worlds that realize what is told in such a story (see
Priest 1997, 2005; Woods 2003: Ch. 6; Berto 2012: Chs. 7, 8; Jago 2014;
cf. also the entry on impossible worlds).
Impossible worlds, however, are for many a difficult pill to swallow.
Lewis himself makes a throwaway remark that might suggest a moderate
alternative – he adds:
(such a view would be a kind of extended modal fictionalism—see §1.5 of
the entry on modal fictionalism). Lewis makes a further appeal to this idea
in a letter to Graham Priest (9 January, 2001), although only to assert that
the idea is of limited usefulness. In his words,
Currie’s diagnosis of the problem of truth in impossible fictions is very
different. He thinks that worlds simply constitute the wrong currency for
characterizing the notion of truth in fiction, even when authorial and
community belief is added to the mix (as on Analysis 2). Currie thinks that
once we understand the notion of truth in fiction in doxastic terms as what
we can reasonably take the fictional author to believe (account C above),
or perhaps we should expect to have [a non-trivial concept of truth
in blatantly impossible fiction] only under the pretense—not to be
taken too seriously—that there are impossible possible worlds as
well as possible possible worlds. (1978 [1983: 275])
I agree with you about the many uses to which we could put make-
believedly possible impossibilities, if we are willing to use them.
The trouble is that all these uses seem to require a distinction
between the subtle ones and the blatant ones (very likely context-
dependent, very likely a matter of degree) and that is just what I
don’t understand. (Lewis 2004, 177)
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the case of radically inconsistent fiction presents no further problems.
There is no bar, he thinks, to supposing that someone believes impossible
propositions, even simple impossible propositions like , and so
there can be no objection to the claim that even blatantly impossible
propositions can be true in a work of fiction.
But while this may work for the simplest cases, it is not clear that we can
be so sanguine about others. Thus, consider stories like Gendler’s story of
the Tower of Goldbach in which  and  (Gendler
2000), or Priest’s story of Sylvan’s box, empty and non-empty at the same
time. It is one thing to allow that such contradictory propositions are both
true in the relevant story; understanding how it can be reasonable to
attribute belief in both propositions to a fictional author may be more
difficult. Or consider a story in which everything whatsoever is true
(imagine a story in which God or Sylvan discloses this to Priest). Even
those who think that there is no bar to believing impossible propositions
are likely to reject as incoherent the thought that someone can believe all
propositions (cf. Priest 2000).
Note that the problem of impossible fictions affects Walton’s make-believe
account rather differently. Truth in fiction for Walton is a function of
prescriptions to imagine, and he is relatively sanguine about such
prescriptions in the case of impossible fictions. Even contradictions, he
suspects, can be imagined in the relevant sense, but he adds that even if
they can’t, his account of fictionality or fictional truth is safe. He offers
two options: first, there might be prescriptions to imagine a contradiction
even if actually imagining it is not possible; secondly, there might be
separate prescriptions to imagine p and not-p, but not their conjunction
(Walton 1990, 64–66).
The second way is an analogue of Lewis’s method of intersection. Perhaps
the first way is needed to deal with the case of blatant contradictions, but
7 + 5 ≠ 12
7 + 5 ≠ 12 7 + 5 = 12
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as Walton notes even this is far from clear. While imagining a
contradiction may well not be possible if imagination relies purely on
mental imagery, the kind of imagining invoked in fiction is very different:
what is at stake here is propositional imagining and it is difficult to
motivate the claim that imagining even blatant contradictions is
impossible. Attempts to do so tend to rest on quite contentious views of
what propositional imagining must involve (cf. Everett 2013; cf. also
Kung 2016 on the telescopic versus stipulative views of imagining).
3. Truth Through Fiction
After his discussion of truth in fiction, Lewis acknowledged in Postscript
B that some people value fiction “mostly as a means for the discovery of
truth, or for the communication of truth” (Lewis 1983: 278), that is,
genuine truth, not merely fictional truth. It is possible that Lewis simply
meant that sentences like “In the Holmes stories, Holmes is a detective”
are really, and not just fictionally, true, for this fact captures the sense in
which it is really true, say, that Holmes is a detective and really false that
he is a rockstar. But the problem of whether fiction-involving sentences
communicate truths does not end here. There are various other ways of
understanding how fiction might make such a contribution. To begin with,
some statements true in a work of fiction are also genuine truths, included
because the author wanted an appropriately realistic setting for the work
(e.g., historical statements in works of historical fiction) or in order to
acquaint readers with facts that the author regards as morally or politically
significant (consider, for example, the fiction of Charles Dickens, Upton
Sinclair, or Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn). Whatever the reason, such cases
suggest that fiction can serve as a means for readers to discover genuine
truths.
Philosophers and literary theorists by and large agree with this claim
(Friend 2006; Lamarque & Olsen 1994). Even on imagination-based
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theories of fiction, there is nothing to prevent statements that readers are
invited to imagine as true from also being known as fact. This is
consistent, however, with acknowledging that learning from fiction is not
always easy, since it requires an ability to tell whether an apparently
factual claim in a work of fiction has been included in the fiction because
of its truth or for other reasons. More generally, a number of psychological
studies suggest that readers often lack the ability to tell truth from
falsehood in fiction, failing to adequately scrutinize information when
engaging with fiction while being more careful in the case of non-fiction
(see, for example, Prentice & Gerrig 1999; Wheeler et al. 1999; Butler et
al. 2012). While this propensity on the part of readers doesn’t show that
they are never able to gain factual knowledge rather than mere (true) belief
from engaging with works of fiction, it may make it harder than it first
appears. One plausible suggestion is that where there is knowledge rather
than mere belief, this happens because readers have acquired a
competence at reliably discriminating truth from falsity in works of that
genre (Friend 2014).
But learning factual truths is not what philosophers and literary theorists
usually have in mind when they think of fiction as a means for the
discovery, or communication, of truth. They have in mind truth that has
deeper human significance, like the universals that Aristotle claims in The
Poetics to find in the works of poets, or the kind of truth about human
nature, for example, that Samuel Johnson finds in Shakespeare (“he has
not only shewn human nature as it acts in real exigencies, but as it would
be found in trials, to which it cannot be exposed”; Johnson 1765). Many
philosophers thus embrace what is commonly called (literary) cognitivism,
which claims that literary fiction can contribute to readers’ knowledge in a
way that adds to the literary or aesthetic value of a work (Davies 2007;
Gaut 2005).
Fiction
44 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
But knowledge in what sense? Like Aristotle, a number of cognitivists
think that literature can form the basis of propositional knowledge, even if
there is dispute about what kind of propositions can be known and how
they are known (Novitz 1987***not in bib***; McCormick 1988; Carroll
2011; Kieran 2004; Kivy 1997; Elgin 2007; Mikkonen 2013). A common
claim is that literature provides knowledge about moral values, especially
about the particular moral requirements of concrete situations (cf. the
appeal in Nussbaum 1990 to the later novels of Henry James). Some think
literature can also provide a kind of conceptual knowledge, such as insight
into a moral concept like sympathy (John 1998). Others have thought it
can even teach deep psychological truths or truths about our place in the
world. In many cases, however, the “truths” readers claim to find in
literature will be quite contestable, with different works presenting
different points of view. Even then, however, it might be argued that
readers at least acquire knowledge of possibilities. Consider, for example,
a work like Céline’s Journey to the End of Night (1932), whose underlying
hypothesis is that all humans and their institutions are abhorrent. Even
Putnam, who is broadly sympathetic to cognitivism, agrees that all we
really learn from Céline’s work is how the world looks to someone who
accepts that hypothesis, which is merely “knowledge of a possibility”
(Putnam 1978).
Many cognitivists, however, think that the knowledge we acquire from
literary fiction is not centrally a kind of propositional or even conceptual
knowledge, but a kind of practical knowledge. For example, literature can
cause us to attend to the world in a more focused way, enriching our
perceptual experience and emotional and moral understanding (Diamond
1995; Nussbaum 1985***not in bib***, 1990, 2001***not in bib***;
Gibson 2007; Robinson 1995 [1997]). One way it might do this is by
being a source of what Davies calls categorial understanding (2007: 146),
yielding new categories through which to understand the world, for
example quixotic and Kafkaesque (Goodman 1978: Ch. 4). It can also
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provide phenomenal knowledge: knowledge of what it is like to be a
certain kind of person or be in a certain kind of situation, and so
knowledge that can be put to use in planning or to help us understand
other people or the moral complexity of situations (Kieran 1996; Currie
1998; Putnam 1978; Carroll 2002; Swirski 2007).
Many are sceptical. Anti-cognitivists think that, whether or not a work’s
aesthetic or literary value would be enhanced by contributing knowledge.
Echoing Plato’s famous charge in The Republic, Jerome Stolniz (1992) has
argued that there is no proper domain of artistic knowledge: significant
truths found in literary works are the proper subject of other areas of
enquiry, not literature. Even if one does acquire beliefs from literary
works, the works themselves don’t supply the warrant for the beliefs, and
so can scarcely be said to yield knowledge. Furthermore, to the extent that
we do learn from literature it is either hard to articulate what we learn, or
the truths turn out to be cognitively trivial; Pride and Prejudice (1813), for
example, may teach us little more than the banal “Stubborn pride and
ignorant prejudice keep attractive people apart” (Stolniz 1992: 193).
Others have raised doubts about the ability of literary fiction to yield the
kind of substantial practical knowledge that is often claimed for it.
Reading Styron’s historical novel, The Confessions of Nat Turner (1967)
may make us think we know what it was like to be a black slave in early
nineteenth century Virginia, but it is surely more likely that exposure of
this kind simply generates the illusion of knowledge (Harold 2016).
Cognitivists have fought back in a number of ways. Propositional
cognitivists have argued that literature does offer support for its
knowledge claims, say by taking them as live hypotheses to be tested
(Kivy 1996, Novitz 1987***not in bib***) or by allowing readers to draw
on latent memories and other available resources (Carroll 2011) as well as
argumentative resources explicitly found in the text (Mikkonen 2013).
And both propositional and non-propositional cognitivists have
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acknowledged that there is no certain route to knowledge through
literature; as in the case of our acquiring factual beliefs on the basis of
reading fiction, literary works can make us less knowledgeable (believe
falsely or behave unwisely) as well as more knowledgeable.
A final point. As we have seen above, literary cognitivists think that a
work of literary fiction can contribute to readers’ knowledge in a way that
adds to the value of the work; anti-cognitivists deny that it can contribute
the kind of knowledge cognitivists focus on. More radically, however, one
of the best-known concerns about literary cognitivism is that, even if
literary works do provide readers with knowledge, the knowledge they
yield doesn’t contribute to their literary value. Such a non-cognitivist view
is associated in particular with the work of Lamarque and Olsen, who have
offered an influential argument for a “no-truth” theory of literary fiction
(Lamarque & Olsen 1994). On this view, while we may well be able to
learn from literature, the truth of a claim made by a literary work is never
relevant to the work’s literary value; all that is relevant is a work’s theme
and how it is presented. Not surprisingly, this view has also proved highly
contentious, with many commentators critical of the separation of theme
and truth (see, for example, Rowe 1997; Gaut 2005; Kivy 2011).
4. The Paradox of Fiction
Whether works of fiction provides readers with knowledge (and, if so,
what kind), there is little doubt that authors of such works often aim to
communicate what they take to be salient truths in the hope of affecting
their readers in some way. Upton Sinclair, for example, wanted readers of
The Jungle (1906) to recognize the poor treatment of workers in Chicago
slaughter-houses, and to respond to this treatment with anger. Even more
familiar, however, is the way authors try to get readers of a work of fiction
to respond emotionally to the fictional truths they encounter in the work,
rather than any actual truths. To take a classic example, on reading
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Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, a reader may feel deep pity for Anna Karenina
because of her increasing despair as Vronsky distances himself from her,
an emotion Tolstoy no doubt expected and intended. But this generates a
famous puzzle: how can a reader feel pity for Anna, knowing that Anna
doesn’t exist? This puzzle, commonly known as the paradox of fiction or
the paradox of fictional emotions, involves a triad of seemingly
compelling but incompatible claims about emotional responses generated
by engaging with fiction. For a representative formulation:
(A) People experience emotions for fictional objects and situations,
knowing them to be fictional
(B) People do not believe that fictional objects and situations exist
(C) In order to experience an emotion for an object or situation, one must
believe that it exists
(A broadly equivalent formulation is found in Gendler’s entry on
imagination.) The question is how best to resolve the inconsistency among
these claims; that is, which of (A)–(C) to give up so that consistency is
restored, and why these and not others.
Different solutions to the paradox provide different answers to such
questions, although it is worth noting that the paper that introduced the
paradox to the philosophical world, Colin Radford’s “How can we be
moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?” (Radford 1975) took a rather
different line from other solutions. His Irrationalist solution (our
classification follows Levinson 1997) holds that people’s apparent ability
to respond emotionally to fictional characters and events is “irrational,
incoherent, and inconsistent” (Radford 1975: 75). They regard (C) as a
normative constraint on rational agents, but their actual behavior and
beliefs, as described in (A) and (B), show that they fail to conform to this
constraint.
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Dissatisfaction with Radford’s account resulted in numerous publications
that have kept discussion of the problem alive. Most, in fact, favor a
rejection of (A) or (C). Among those who reject (A), some deny (A) on the
grounds that it misdescribes the nature of our affective responses.
According to the Non-Intentionalist solution the affective states in
question are not emotions but more akin to object-less states like moods or
reflex reactions (Charlton 1970: 97), while for the more popular
Surrogate-Object solution (A) misidentifies the target of emotional
responses to fiction: they really have as their objects (parts of) the fictional
work itself; or perhaps the descriptions or thought contents afforded by the
fiction (Lamarque 1981); or on another formulation real individuals or
phenomena that resemble the persons or events of the fiction (see, for
example, Charlton 1984).
A third way of denying (A) is Kendall Walton’s well-known Make-Believe
solution to the paradox (Walton 1990, 1997; see also Currie 1990).
According to Walton, it is fictional in the imaginative games of make-
believe that people play on the basis of their reading works of fiction that
they experience emotions for fictional objects and situations. In reality
they don’t. A reader of Anna Karenina (1877) doesn’t really pity Anna
Karenina, but what she does experience are various characteristic
psychological and bodily effects of her imagining that Anna Karenina has
suffered greatly. Originally, Walton called states of this kind quasi-
emotions (in this case, quasi-pity); the fact that a reader experiences quasi-
pity in the course of her imagining is what makes it fictional in her game
of make-believe that she feels genuine pity for Anna Karenina. A case of
real pity, by contrast, requires the quasi-pity that an agent experiences to
be the result of her genuine belief that someone is suffering or has suffered
(Walton 1990: 251), and only when this is its cause will the quasi-pity also
be accompanied by appropriate behavior: an attempt to console if
consoling is within one’s power, say. (Walton’s classic example of the
absence of appropriate behavior is that of not running out of the theatre,
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even though in the grip of quasi-fear, while watching a horror movie in
which the Green Slime turns towards you.) Walton clarifies his view in
Walton 1997, where he emphasizes that he regards fictional emotions not
so much as special kind of states, but as emotions that are merely felt in
the context of engaging with fiction rather than actuality. What Walton
cannot allow, however, is that it is genuinely true that people have
emotions in this sense towards fictional characters like Anna Karenina. No
relational claims of this kind can be genuinely true for Walton, since he
denies that there are any fictional characters. (Whether his rejection of
fictional characters is required by his reasons for rejecting (A) is another
question. For more on this question, see the entry on the fictional entities.)
Walton’s view has been subject to much criticism (for a survey, see Neill
2005). Before we turn to its main rivals, it is worth observing that
Walton’s main reason for not counting fictional emotions as real emotions
(the lack of characteristic associated behavior) is also the main reason why
few commentators nowadays accept the Suspension of Disbelief solution,
which involves rejecting (B) and maintaining that when readers of fiction
emotionally respond to the characters they read about they are acting on an
implicit belief that these exist. (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who coined the
term, may have held a version of this view; cf. Coleridge 1817: ch. 14 [in
vol. 2, p. 2].) For discussion, see Radford 1975, Schaper 1978, and Carroll
1990.)
Far more popular are views that reject (C) and hold that we have real
emotions towards fictional objects despite believing that they don’t exist.
A possible reason for this is that, unlike the two other statements of the
triad, (C) strikes many as a piece of articulated theory (the so-called
cognitive theory of emotion) rather than a commonsense claim (cf.
Gendler 2008). One way of rejecting (C) is the Surrogate-Belief solution,
which maintains that an emotional response to a fictional character
requires no more than the belief that the character exists in the world(s) of
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the fiction (cf. Neill 1993). Another solution—and possibly the most
widely accepted of all—is the Anti-Judgmentalist solution, which denies
that emotional responses to objects logically require beliefs concerning the
existence and emotion-prompting features of objects; instead, it is enough
if we imagine, “mentally represent” (Lamarque 1981), or entertain, such
objects “in thought” (Carroll 1990). (See also Stecker 2011, which regards
this solution as in some sense the default solution; he thinks other
solutions are nonetheless worth investigating because of the way they shed
light on the way our reactions to fiction often differ from standard
emotional reactions.) Versions of such “thought theories” are also
defended in Moran 1994, Smith 1995, Feagin 1996, and Gendler 2008.
But note that such views face the problem that the objects of the emotions
mobilized by fiction are either understood in some nonstandard way, for
example as thought contents (cf. the objection in Walton 1990 to
Lamarque 1981) or, more generally, as abstract rather than concrete
entities; or they are understood as nonexistent objects, a category many
philosophers find ontologically problematic. (For a useful overview of the
various solutions, see Gendler & Kovakovich 2006. See also the entry on
fictional entities.)
5. Conclusion
This entry has focused on a number of central issues in the philosophy of
fiction: the nature of fiction; what it means to say that something is a truth
of fiction (including the problem presented for the notion of truth in fiction
by impossible fictions); what, and in what sense, we can learn from fiction;
and how we can have emotional responses to characters of fiction. It is
important to acknowledge that there are other issues in the philosophy of
fiction that could have been discussed in an entry like this, a number of
them the subject of related entries. Thus consider the question of what
makes something a correct interpretation of a work of literary fiction. This
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topic is connected to the issue of truth in fiction and became of intense
interest to both philosophers and literary theorists following the
publication of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946),
although the topic of interpretation itself has a long history going back as
far as Greek antiquity (see the entry on hermeneutics.) There are alos
problems involving our reasons for seeking out works of fiction of various
kinds. The previous section discussed the so-called paradox of fiction, but
as it turns out this is a relative newcomer to the set of problems that
involve our engagement with works of fiction. There is also the much-
debated puzzle of why we enjoy works of tragedy (and even horror);
sadness and fear are scarcely emotions that we would normally welcome,
let alone enjoy, yet people readily engage with works of tragedy. A newer
problem, although discussion goes back to at least Hume, is the so-called
problem of imaginative resistance: given the ease with which readers of
fiction can entertain all kinds of implausible fictional scenarios, even
impossible ones, what explains the impediments we face when asked to
imagine certain sorts of situations, for example ones in which morally
horrendous acts like torturing an innocent person are considered morally
right? (For an overview of these puzzles, see the supplement to the entry
on imagination).
Juxtaposing these various problems as well as the other issues and puzzles
tackled in this entry is instructive, and a good way to end this entry. The
problem of the interpretation of literary fiction as that problem is currently
understood involves both the philosophy of language and of art, and so
understood is in some ways a peculiarly modern problem (like the
problem of truth in fiction), even though its roots go back to antiquity. The
paradox of tragedy, on the other hand, is an old problem. It received a
famous treatment, still debated in contemporary philosophy, at the hands
of Aristotle in the Poetics, who also used tragedy as an example of how
we can learn from fiction. Finally, the problem of imaginative resistance is
a problem that exercised Hume but has had a recent renaissance that has
Fiction
52 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
involved not only philosophers but also some cognitive and social
psychologists. The juxtaposition of these various problems and issues
reminds us once again of the richness of contemporary philosophy of
fiction as well as of its long history, features that augur well for the future
of the subject.
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